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UNION AUTHORIZATION CARDS
treatment for illegitimates under the equal protection clause is at
stake. As Mr. Justice Douglas stated for the majority in Levy:
"[W]e have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic
civil rights . . . and have not hesitated to strike down an invid-
ious classification even though it had history and tradition on its
side."5 1 Because discriminatory classifications based on illegitimacy
are inherently suspect, regulation of succession is not subject to the
unbridled discretion of the states. Concededly, the illegitimate
child will not be completely equal to his legitimate counterpart
since he will be required to prove his paternity or maternity before
enjoying his right of inheritance; but he will be equal in the sense
that any claimant able to prove a family relationship will enjoy
these rights on an equal basis with legitimate descendants.
NoRMAN A. LEVIN.
LABOR LAW - EMPLOYER'S DUTY TO BARGAIN -
AUTHORIZATION CARDS
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575 (1969).
A primary purpose of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) is to encourage collective bargaining and to protect "the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of their own choosing."1
A basic problem in achieving this objective has been the develop-
ment of a fair and efficient means by which workers can choose
their bargaining representatives. Traditionally, employees have se-
lected their union by means of a secret ballot, but with the highly
emotional atmosphere usually present at the typical election it may
be more realistic to assume that such a "democratic" process is not
completely secret nor free from untoward pressures from both sides.
Frequently, the union and employer use any means - both legal
and illegal - in an attempt to influence the results of the balloting.
As a result, the NLRB and the courts have been hard pressed to
insure the existence of "laboratory conditions" at the time of ballot-
ing. Nevertheless, since it is virtually impossible to police every
aspect of the election, irregularities often do occur, thus rendering
r" 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
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a fair election relatively improbable. In the face of this perplexing
dilemma the courts and the Board have been forced to look to other
methods of determining the workers' choice. In NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co.,2 the Supreme Court seems to have firmly established
the use of authorization cards3 as an alternative indicator of em-
ployee preference when the employer's misconduct prevents the
holding of a fair and representative election.
In Gissel the union notified the employer that it had obtained
authorization cards from 31 of 47 employees. The employer re-
fused to recognize the union and continued to wage an anti-union
campaign. Instead of filing for an election, the union filed charges
of unfair labor practices claiming that the company had violated
the NLRA: Section 8(a)(1), by coercively interrogating and
intimidating employees; section 8(a)(3), by discriminatorily dis-
charging two union adherents; and section 8(a)(5), by refusing
to bargain.4  The NLRB agreed and issued a bargaining order. The
1 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
NLRA].
2395 U.S. 575 (1969). Gissel is actually a consolidation of three cases with simi-
lar factual situations. (NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); General Steel Prods., Inc. v.
NLRB, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968)). In each case there were violations of the NLRA
and a resultant request to bargain on the basis of a card majority. In each case the
Fourth Circuit refused to enforce a bargaining order against the employer. The Su-
preme Court combined the cases on appeal and examined in greater detail the factual
situation of Gissel.
3 Authorization cards are used by union solicitors during an organization cam-
paign. The current Board practice is not to conduct an election unless the union has
obtained cards signed by at least 30 percent of the employees in the particular unit.
This eliminates the need to conduct an election where the union has no chance of suc-
cess. There are two types of cards: one indicates the signer desires an election; the
other authorizes the union to represent the signer in collective bargaining. The latter
(the type of card used in Gissel) may be used either to petition for an election or to
determine if the signer wants union representation. The wording of the Gissel card
was as follows:
APPLICATION
FOOD STORE EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL #347
(the union's address)
The undersigned hereby authorizes this Union to represent his or her in-
terest in collective bargaining concerning wages, hours, and working condi-
tions.
There was a space at the bottom for the worker's name, address, and other information.
Brief for Petitioner at 4, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
4 Section 8(a) of the NLRA provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees ....
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure or employment . . . to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor organization ....
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)
(1964).
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court of appeals affirmed the NLRB's additional order requiring
the employer to remedy the section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) viola-
tions, but refused to enforce the bargaining order,5 holding that the
employer had a "good faith doubt" as to the union's majority.8 On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the pivotal issue of
whether authorization cards themselves could serve as grounds for a
bargaining order was resolved on the basis of answers to three
questions: (1) Does the NLRA require an election? (2) How
valid are the authorization cards as indicators of employee's de-
sires? (3) What factors should the court consider in determining
whether to issue a bargaining order or to require an election?
The Court affirmed the NLRB's contention that the Act does
not require a formal election for employees to select their repre-
sentative. In so holding, the Court looked to the sections of the
Act that relate either directly or indirectly to the selection process.
While section 8(a) (5)7 requires that the employer bargain with the
"representatives of his employees," there is no requirement that such
representatives must be elected. Section 9(a) 8 delineates the pro-
cedures for choosing these representatives by providing that they be
"designated or selected" by a "majority of the employees." Once
again, there is no suggestion that an actual election is necessary.9
5 However, in a factually similar case, Sinclair Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 157 (lst
Cr. 1968), the First Circuit sustained all of the NLRB's findings and ordered the
employer to bargain with the Union. This conflict between the circuits prompted the
Supreme Court to consider the instant cases.
6 The finding of a "good faith doubt" was the basis of the test formerly used by the
Board in deciding whether to issue a bargaining order. For a discussion of this test,
see text accompanying notes 25-28 infra.
7 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964). The pertinent provisions of section 8(a)(5) are set
out in note 4 supra.
8 Section 9(a) of the NLRA.provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit. 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
9 The leading case in this area is Frank Bros. Co. v. NI.RB, 321 U.S. 702 (1943).
The union had obtained signed cards from 45 to 80 employees and had filed for an
election when the employer began a vigorous anti-union campaign. The union with-
drew its petition and instead filed charges of unfair labor practices. Meanwhile 7
months passed and 13 of the original union proponents had left the company. Even
though the union no longer had a majority, the NLRB issued a bargaining order, rul-
ing that the employer should have bargained when there was a majority. The Supreme
Court affirmed the Board's position, reasoning that to do otherwise would encour-
age employers to refuse to bargain and to purposely delay in the hope that the union
support would dissipate. In response to the argument that the employees were de-
prived of a free choice, the Court answered that the bargaining relationship was not
permanent. Consequently, if after the initial arrangement had undergone a trial pe-
riod the employees were dissatisfied, they could effectuate the selection of a new agent.
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The Court also considered it significant that the House version of
the Taft-Hartley Bill,"0 which would have amended section 8(a) (5)
to require the employer to bargain only with a certified union, was
rejected at the House-Senate conference." Since the NLRA makes
an election a prerequisite to certification,'12 the rejection of this pro-
posed change suggests that the legislators recognized the existence
of other means for designating representatives. Thus, it is clear
from both the history of the NLRA and the express wording of the
adopted version of the amendment itself that an election was not
intended to be the sole means of selecting a bargaining agent.
Notwithstanding, the company argued that a 1947 amendment
to section 9(c) gave the employer an absolute right to an election."
The Court, however, looked to the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act and noted that the purpose of the amendment was
merely to permit employers to petition for an election when a union
demanded recognition. Prior to 1947, only the union and the em-
ployees had the right to initiate the petition; the amendment did
no more than extend this same right to the employer.' The com-
pany further contended that an additional change to section 9(c),
requiring an election as a prerequisite to certification, made an elec-
tion the exclusive means of selecting representatives. 15 However,
10 The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 amended the NLRA generally to make the pro-
visions of the Act "two-sided."
The House version of section 8(a)(5) would have required the employer to bar-
gain if the union is "currently recognized by the employer or certified as such under
section 9." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1947); 1 NLRB, LEGISLA-
THVP HISTORy OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 51 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
"In his report on the changes made in the bill at this conference, Mr. Hartley
gave no reason why the House amendment was rejected. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 545.
12 For a discussion of this provision of the NLRA, see notes 15-16 infra & accom-
panying text
13 Section 9(c) in its amended form provides:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed . . . (A) by an employee . . . (B)
by an employer . . . the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has
reasonable cause to believe... that such a question of representation exists,
it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1964).
14 Prior to the 1947 amendments, the NLRA did not specify who might petition the
NLRB for an election, and the Board had interpreted it to mean that only the em-
ployees or the union could so petition. Such an interpretation effectively prevented
the employer from testing a claim by the union that it represented a majority of the
workers. Section 9(c)(1)(B) was added to the NLRA in 1947 to give the employer
the right to petition when he was confronted with a union demand for recognition.
H.R REP. No. 245, supra note 10, at 35; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at
326, 416-17; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947).
15 Prior to the 1947 amendments, section 9(c) of the NLRA provided that the
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the Court viewed this amendment as only changing the require-
ment for certification. Sections 8(a) (5) and 9(a) still require the
employer to bargain with the representative selected by the em-
ployees, whether or not that representative is certified."8 Since an
employer may be required to recognize and bargain with a union
which has not been certified, there obviously must be another
method of obtaining recognition.
In the past the NLRB has occasionally used authorization cards
to determine the workers' preference when a union was demanding
recognition. However, the use of the cards for this purpose has
been widely criticized'7 because of the atmosphere surrounding a
typical card drive. Signatures on such cards are normally obtained
in person by union organizers as they talk to employees, either alone
or in groups. Since there is no secrecy surrounding the solicitation,
the worker may be subjected to group pressures, promises, and
threats. Often he signs without fully understanding the conse-
quences. The NLRB has made every effort to purify this solicita-
tion process and thus enable the employee to make an unfettered
decision. Its position was enunciated in Cumberland Shoe Corp.,18
where cards unambiguously authorizing the union to act as the
employee's bargaining agent were held valid because the employ-
ees were not told that the sole purpose of the cards was to request an
election. The effect of such a ruling is to permit a union organizer
Board may certify "representatives that have been designated or selected." It further
provided that the NLRB "may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other
suitable method to ascertain such representative." Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 9(c),
49 Star. 449.
16The recognition of a distinction between a certified and a recognized union is
vital to the Court's reasoning. The Court noted that the following privileges are af-
forded only to a certified union: Protection for 12 months against the filing of new
election petitions (section 9(c)(3)); protection for a reasonable period against claims
that the union no longer represents a majority (Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954));
protection against recognitional picketing by a rival union (section 8(b)(4)(C)); free-
dom from the restrictions of section 8(b)(4)(D) in work assignment disputes; and
freedom from the restrictions of section 8(b)(7) on recognitional and organizational
picketing. 395 U.S. at 599 n.14.
A case decided since 1947 which distinguishes between recognition and certifica-
tion is United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
There the union had not filed certain financial data and non-communist affidavits -
a prerequisite to obtaining NLRB certification. Even so, the employer was required
to recognize the union since it had authorization cards from a majority. The Supreme
Court held that representation is not dependent on certification by the Board.
17 The dissenting opinion in NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684, 693
(2d Cir. 1966), refers to the cards as a "notoriously unreliable method of determin-
ing majority status of a union." See generally Comment, Union Authorization Cards,
75 YALE LJ. 805 (1966).
18 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1964).
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to operate without restriction as long as he refrains from using
"only" in his representations; 9 yet the worker may still be left with
a misunderstanding as to the purpose of the cards. For this reason
many courts have refused to enforce bargaining orders in cases where
signatures were obtained through misrepresentations. ° The NLRB
responded to this judicial criticism and cautioned against future
mechanical applications of this rule by relying entirely on magic
words such as "sole" or "only." 21  In spite of the recent trend to-
ward a more liberal application of this doctrine and the NLRB's
caveat against mechanical application of the doctrine, the Supreme
Court in Gissel, not only affirmed the Cumberland Shoe doctrine,
19 For example, in NLRB v. Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., 359 F.2d 684 (2d Cir.
1966), the union organizer told employees: 'The cards are for a vote," and "Sign the
cards so we can have a vote;" yet, the court refused to invalidate the cards since the
employees were not told the cards were only for an election. Id. at 686. The dissent
noted the danger of relying on the word "only" in determining fraud and said the rule
came "close to the little bit pregnant notion." Id. at 698.
2 0 The Sixth Circuit (which on appeal had enforced Cumberland Shoe) later re-
fused to enforce a bargaining order after invalidating some of the cards because of mis-
representation. In NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc., 384 F.2d 609 (6th Cit. 1967),
the court stated:
[We do not consider that we have announced a rule that only where the
solicitor of a card actually employs the specified words "this card is for the
sole and only purpose of having an election" will a card be invalidated. We
did nor intend such a narrow and mechanical rule. We believe that what-
ever the style or actual words of the solicitation, if it is dearly calculated to
create in the mind of the one solicited a belief that the only purpose of the
card is to obtain an election, an invalidation of such card does not offend
our Cumberland rule.
The undenied statement of Makowski here that the cards "did not mean a
thing" other than for election and that the signing of the cards "wasn't join-
ing the union" were clear misrepresentations .... Id. at 618-19.
Accord, NLRB v. S.B. Nichols Co., 380 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1967). See generally
Browne, Obligation to Bargain on Basis of Card Majority, 3 GA. L REV. 334 (1969).
Browne states that all of the courts which have recently considered the Cumberland
rule have rejected it. Id. at 339. Union organizers do not always attempt to misrep-
resent the purpose of the cards; of the three cases consolidated in Gissel the validity
of the cards was challenged only in General Steel.
In defense of the Board's policy, it should be noted that when the cards are chal-
lenged the hearing is usually held months after the signing. The employee may not
remember exactly what he was told at the time, and what he does remember may be
influenced by what he thinks his employer would like to hear. Sheinkman, Recogni-
tion of Unions Through Authorization Cards, 3 GA. L. REV. 319, 332-33 (1969).
21 See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338, 1341-42
n.7 (1968). In Levi, the Board attempted to answer some of the recent criticism by
reasoning that misrepresentation is not confined to situations where "sole" and "only"
are used; it is not the use of "magic words," but the "totality of circumstances" which
will be considered when judging the validity of the cards. It is submitted, however,
that the Board failed to heed its own warning. One member dissenting from the
Board's findings as to the validity of the cards in Levi, cited statements, such as "sign-
ing a card didn't mean that we were joining the union," to show that there had been
misrepresentation. Id. at 1340-41 n.3.
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but, indeed, seems to have relied on such magic words itself.22 The
Court held that when the card states clearly, in plain language that
the employee authorizes the union to represent him, the employee
should be bound. Justification for the use of the rule was found
in the increasing degree of sophistication possessed by the average
worker.23
Because the cards are subject to abuse, both the NLRB and the
Supreme Court agree that an election is the favored method of
selection in most circumstances; 24 the cards should only be used if
there is no other satisfactory means to gauge employee desires. In
determining whether to use the cards or to hold an election, the
NLRB traditionally had used the "good faith doubt" test set forth
in Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB.2"  There the court stated that
the employer may insist on an election if he dearly shows that his
refusal to recognize the union stems from a bona fide doubt as to
the union's majority status.26  The existence of a "good faith doubt"
was determined by the facts of the particular case, and employer
unfair labor practices were usually interpreted as evidence of "bad
faith." The NLRB modified the joy Silk doctrine in 1966 by
shifting the burden of proof, thus requiring the General Counsel
2 2 1n Gissel, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the NLRB concerning
alleged misrepresentations by the union organizer in General Steel. The NLRB had
found the following statements to be insufficient to invalidate the cards: "(1) that the
card would be used to get an election, (2) that [the employee] had the right to vote
either way, even though he signed the card, and (3) that the card would be kept secret
and not shown to anybody except to the Board in order to get an election." General
Steel Prods., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 636, 645 (1966). The trial examiner found that this
was not the "absolute equivalent of telling the employee it will be used 'only' for the
purposes of obtaining an election." Id. This certainly seems to be a mechanical appli-
cation of the Cumberland rule, yet the Court affirmed this conclusion, stating that it rep-
resented the "limits" of the rule.
23 Yet, in finding a violation of section 8(a)(1), the trial examiner in General
Steel placed great weight on the illiteracy of the employees which made it possible for
the employer to create in the employees a false impression of their right to strike. It
is submitted that illiteracy could affect to a comparable degree the employees' under-
standing of the purpose of the cards in Gissel.
24This is reflected in the statistics for 1967 which show that there were 8,116
elections, while only 157 bargaining orders were issued on the basis of a card majority.
Levi Strauss & Co., 172 N.L.LB. No. 57, 68 L.KR.M. 1338, 1342 n.9 (1968). How-
ever, one author notes that there is a "steadily increasing use of cards" for this purpose
- 12 cases in 1964; twice as many in 1965; and about 117 in 1966. Browne, supra
note 20, at 347.
25 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
20 The Board stressed the importance of the employer's motive. If there was doubt
as to the union's majority the employer might insist on the election; not so, however, if
he was motivated by a rejection of the bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time
in which to undermine the union. Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949).
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to present evidence establishing the employer's "bad faith.""7  The
Board further declared that the employer no longer needed to give
a reason for refusing to bargain, and that not every unfair labor
practice would automatically lead to a bargaining order.
In arguing Gissel, the NLRB announced that its current practice
was to issue a bargaining order based on a card majority when an
employer's unfair labor practices had disrupted the election proc-
ess. The Board admitted that it had used the term "bad faith"
in some of its recent decisions; however, it urged that "bad faith"
was only found when the possibility of a fair election was unlikely.
Notwithstanding the allegedly favorable effect of the Board's cur-
rent mode of administering the test, the Gissel Court adopted a
new standard which completely discards any vestiges of the "good
faith doubt" test. An employer may now refuse to bargain with a
union on the basis of cards alone, and, instead, may either petition
for an election or require the union to do so. Before initiating the
election procedures, the Board will examine the employer's pre-
election conduct. If, in its opinion, any unfair labor practices pre-
clude the holding of a fair election, the Board will look to the
cards as the basis for a potential bargaining order.28
In its decision the Court attempted to strike a balance, taking
into account the rights of the union, the employer, and the em-
ployee. It rejected the union's contention that cards should be
used more freely and recognized that an election is the preferred
means of attaining recognition.29 Yet, it also acknowledged that an
employer's unfair labor practices may prejudice the results of the
balloting." Where an unfair labor practice has the potential for
invalidating election results the Board may utilize this alternative
27 Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966). Here the employer committed no
unfair labor practices, but insisted on an election when presented with a request to bar-
gain. The Board refused to issue a bargaining order since the employer's "bad faith"
had not been proved.
28 395 U.S. at 591-92.
29 The union in Gissel had asked the Court to either reaffirm Joy Silk or to at least
require the employer to file for the election rather than allowing him to insist that the
union file. See 395 U.S. at 594-95.
30 Remedies such as cease and desist orders or posting of notices have proven inade-
quate to allay the effects of such serious employer misconduct. Indeed, in the years
1960-62, 70 percent of the rerun elections were won by the party who interfered with
the first election. A notable example is the employer who threatens to close the plant.
See Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209, 212-13, 223
(1963).
Thus, it is submitted, the card-based bargaining order looms as the only alternative
and, in fact, may prove to be the most effective deterrent to future employer miscon-
duct.
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means by issuing a bargaining order based on the union's card ma-
jority and thus prevent the employer's profiting from his illegal acts.
Unfortunately, it seems that here the balancing was terminated.
Indeed, the serious flaw in the decision appears to be the Court's
failure to fully protect the employees' rights by declining to impose
a restriction on the solicitation process which would invalidate
cards obtained through misrepresentation. In relying on Cumber-
land Shoe, the Court has done nothing to curb union abuse of this
rule. In light of the professed concern with the protection of em-
ployee rights, it would seem that more stringent requirements
should be imposed in the validation process to insure that signa-
tures on authorization cards truly reflect employee desires.3 1
In spite of the Court's failure to censure union abuse of the
cards, the decision is basically sound. In establishing a new stan-
dard to replace the "good faith doubt" test, the Court has recog-
nized that it is the employer's conduct rather than his intent which
should determine how the cards will be used. The new test should
be much easier to administer. Since the employer's intent is irrele-
vant, the NLRB need only look for illegal acts that could have prej-
udiced the election. Both the NLRB and the Court agree, however,
that not every unfair labor practice will automatically interfere with
an election; only when the employer's conduct is viewed in light of
the totality of the circumstances surrounding each particular elec-
tion will the true vitiating effect be realized -.32  Since the Court con-
siders the secret ballot to be the most reliable method for ascertain-
ing employee desires, it probably would not approve the use of a
bargaining order if the employer committed no unfair labor prac-
tices. Thus, it seems dear that an employer who is guilty of no mis-
conduct and who is confronted with a union request to bargain on
3l Ironically, it has been argued that the use of authorization cards in this manner
interferes with the employee's right to a free choice of representation. It is submitted,
however, that the use of the secret ballot presents the same problem. Use of the ballot
is premised on the assumption that the employee is able to make an independent, un-
fettered decision. Such a decision becomes quite difficult when the employer has used
coercion and threats in an attempt to influence his choice. See Bok, The Regulation of
Campaign Tactics in Representative Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act,
78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 135 (1964). See also Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining
Rights Without an Election, 65 MiCH. L. REv. 857, 862 (1967), wherein the author
suggests: "When the preferred method of determining employee wishes has been tamp-
ered with, it totally begs the question to say that employee rights are sacrificed by a
bargaining order." The employee rights are affected in any event.
32 For an example of a violation which was not considered severe enough to sup-
port a bargaining order, see Hammon & Irving, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1965). The
employer interrogated 6 of 110 employees. The NLRB found a section 8(a)(1) viola-
tion, but said that not every act of misconduct vitiates the employer's good faith.
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